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Hey Siri, How Does the Judicial
System Treat Searches and
Seizures of Electronic Devices?
Here’s What I Found*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where access to an expansive array of information is open
and freely available from our back pockets, entrenched legal notions
such as privacy and property come to the fore. 1 More to the point, the
Fourth Amendment2 test for balancing government and possessory
interests plays an ever-expanding role in shaping how government
agencies search and seize our electronic devices—or more precisely, our
“virtual homes.”3
When the government searches and seizes personal property, it must
do so within the scope of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. When
that personal property is an electronic device, such a search and seizure
must be carried out in a fashion that is not only reasonable but
comports with notions of investigative diligence and undue delay.

*I would like to thank my Casenote advisor, Anne Johnson, for her dedication to this
Article and this subject. It was our conversations about this topic that inspired this
Article. A big thank you also to my family who never fails to support me. And finally,
muito obrigada (thank you very much) to Rodrigo, who never fails to believe in me and my
larger than life ideas.
1. For an approach limiting expansive use of the judicial body in the area of
technology and Fourth Amendment doctrine, see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment
and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV.
801, 857 (2004).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). See Anna
Lvovsky, Fourth Amendment Moralism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1189 (2018). The author posits
a moralistic perspective of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area. More
specifically, the Supreme Court has tended to shape its concept of privacy in relation to
social and moral attitudes about the particular object or activity being adjudicated, Id. at
1234–35.
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When the Supreme Court of the United States articulated its test
regarding reasonable searches and seizures, it did so during an age
when personal property was less intrinsically valuable to owners.
Today, courts are confronted with the challenge of incorporating these
traditional notions of Fourth-Amendment reasonableness into searches
and seizures of personal effects that are intimately connected with
personal identity. Fortunately, the judicial system has begun to slowly
modify its test in light of modern technological advances in its attempt
to keep abreast of a world that is blazing ahead on a path of
technological change.
The Georgia Supreme Court recently joined both the Supreme Court
of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit on this path when they reviewed the search and
seizure of electronic devices in Rosenbaum v. State.4
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jennifer and Joseph Rosenbaum were the foster parents of
two-year-old Laila Daniel who passed away on November 17, 2015. Not
even one month later, the couple was arrested in connection to Laila’s
death and for the abuse of her sister. During their arrest and
transportation to jail, police lawfully seized the Rosenbaums’ computer,
iPad, and cellphones. Officers subsequently logged each of these items
into the county property room for safekeeping and attached the
property receipts for those devices to the arresting and transporting
officers’ reports.5
Shortly after their arrest, the Rosenbaums requested the return of
their electronic devices, but to no avail. The couple further solicited the
return of those devices on two other occasions in 2016: once in a motion
to recuse, and then again at a bond hearing. On both occasions those
requests for return fell on deaf ears.6 One year later, during a
conversation with the Cobb County District Attorney, the detective
assigned to the case could not recall whether any such devices were
recovered from the Rosenbaums.7
The District Attorney did not become aware of the existence of the
electronic devices until nearly a year and a half after their seizure.8
Just three days after that revelation, and 539 days after the seizure of
the electronic devices, the first of two warrants was issued for those
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

305 Ga. 442, 826 S.E.2d 18 (2019).
Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 442–43, 826 S.E.2d at 20–21.
Id. at 444–45, 826 S.E.2d at 22.
Id. at 444, 826 S.E.2d at 22.
Id.
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devices. A few months later, and a whopping 702 days after the seizure
of the electronic devices, the second of two warrants was issued for
those devices.9 When the lead detective was later questioned as to why
he was unaware of the seizure, he admitted that he had not fully read
his own officers’ reports.10
Nearly two years after their arrest, the Rosenbaums moved to
suppress any evidence retrieved pursuant to the warrants issued in
May and November of 2017. The Rosenbaums argued before the court
and maintained that, for the last two years, they had sought the return
of their electronic devices following three separate occasions: (1) shortly
after their arrest from the Henry County District Attorney; (2) in March
2016 at the motion to recuse; and (3) in September 2016 at a bond
hearing. What’s more, when questioned at the suppression hearing, the
Henry County District Attorney could not recall having any prior
knowledge of the existence of the electronic devices.11
The Rosenbaums’ motion to suppress was granted by the trial court
one month later. The trial court granted the motion and ruled that the
delay between seizure and the issuance of warrants for the electronic
devices was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The state
then appealed the trial court’s order in March 2018. 12
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court examined the trial court’s
analysis of the delay and ultimately affirmed. 13 The Georgia Supreme
Court ruled that the search of the electronic devices was unreasonable
due to the delay in obtaining the warrants. 14
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Seizure of Property Under the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonableness
Standard
In United States v. Place,15 the Supreme Court of the United States
began to develop its reasonableness standard, as it relates to delays in

9. Id. at 443, 826 S.E.2d at 21.
10. Id. at 454, 826 S.E.2d at 28.
11. Id. at 445–46, 826 S.E.2d at 22–23.
12. Id. at 446, 826 S.E.2d at 23.
13. Id. at 454–55, 826 S.E.2d 28.
14. Id. at 455, 826 S.E.2d 28. The Rosenbaums were ultimately convicted in July
2019 for the death of their foster daughter. Joshua Sharpe, Ex-Foster Parents Found
Guilty, Sentenced in Murder Trial, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/jury-still-deliberating-foster-parents-murdertrial/rKC2uz0irJY3nmytPEnwWO/.
15. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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searches and seizures.16 The foundation of this reasonableness standard
arises out of a case involving an interstate traveler and his luggage.
After a call from Drug Enforcement Agents (DEA) in Miami, agents at
LaGuardia Airport stopped the traveler and subjected his luggage to a
“sniff test” by a narcotics dog. The time elapsed during the seizure was
about ninety minutes. The agents were able to obtain a warrant on the
basis of the sniff test a few days later and found 1,125 grams of cocaine
inside the traveler’s luggage. The trial court ultimately denied the
traveler’s motion to suppress the evidence of that search.17
The Supreme Court held that there were two major factors it would
consider when determining the reasonableness of searches under the
Fourth Amendment: (1) the length of the detention (or the “brevity of
the invasion”) and (2) the police’s investigative diligence.18 Behold, the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard was born: “[w]e must
balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”19 Essentially, it
was the fact that DEA agents at LaGuardia Airport had sufficient time
to prepare arrangements for the traveler, which would have
“[M]inimized the intrusion on [his] Fourth Amendment interests” that
rendered the seizure unreasonable.20
Just one term later, in United States v. Jacobsen,21 the Supreme
Court took up yet another landmark Fourth Amendment case. In that
case, federal agents discovered a bag of suspicious white power further
subsumed within two larger packages. The white powder was tested
on–site and confirmed as cocaine. Pursuant to the confirmation, agents
obtained a search warrant and arrested Bradley and Donna Jacobsen. 22
In that case, the Supreme Court defined and delineated a search
from a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.23 According to the
majority, a search arises when “an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed,” and a seizure arises when
“there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory

16. Place, 462 U.S. at 703.
17. Id. at 698–700 (holding that seizure was proper as it was based on reasonable
suspicion and that Place’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated).
18. Id. at 709.
19. Id. at 703.
20. Id. at 709–10.
21. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
22. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111–12.
23. Id. at 113.
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interests in [their] property.”24 Furthermore, the Court articulated that
warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and cannot be
characterized as reasonable simply because law enforcement discover
contraband post hoc.25 Additionally, the Court held that even seizures
lawful in their inception can still violate the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment when that seizure unreasonably infringes upon the
possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 26 Therefore,
the Supreme Court built on its foundation in United States v. Place and
further defined the nature of Fourth Amendment interests as both
privacy and property related.27 However, an important distinction was
made by the Court in United States v. Jacobsen, when it described
Fourth Amendment interests as possessory as in relation to seizures,
but as privacy in relation to searches.28
In 2001, the Supreme Court examined a case involving reasonable
delay in the search of a dwelling.29 After being informed of the presence
of dope in Charles McArthur’s home, an officer went to obtain a warrant
for that residence. Even after being warned by a remaining officer that
McArthur could not reenter the home without the presence of the
officer, McArthur did reenter his residence three separate times. On
each occasion the officer stood just inside the doorway. Law
enforcement obtained a warrant at around five that evening and
searched the residence. Inside, the officers discovered marijuana and
drug paraphernalia. Mr. McArthur moved to suppress the evidence as
“fruit of the unlawful search,” which the trial court granted. 30
The Supreme Court ruled that the search and delay was reasonable
and held that it would not adopt a per se rule of unreasonableness as it
relates to Fourth Amendment requirements. 31 Rather, the Court again
adopted the reasonableness approach under United States v. Place by
balancing “the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to
determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”32 The Court ultimately
ruled that the government-related concerns were considerable, and
thereby remarked that the officers in this case respected McArthur’s
24. Id.
25. Id. at 116.
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id. at 113.
28. Id.
29. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
30. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329.
31. Id. at 331. Presumably because the court has preferred its balancing approach.
Requiring a per se rule would, necessarily eliminate the need to balance possessory and
governmental interests.
32. Id.
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privacy interests by neither searching his home nor arresting him
without a warrant.33 Ultimately, the Court held that the search was
reasonable and demonstrated its continuing adherence to the balancing
approach of United States v. Place relating to reasonableness in
circumstances involving the seizure of both person and property.34 It
furthermore reinforced the Court’s privacy–property distinction in
United States v. Jacobsen, as McArthur had only a privacy-related
interest in his home, which was searched.35
Finally, turning the clock back to the 1960s, the Supreme Court, in
its landmark decision in Katz v. United States,36 toyed with the concept
of a constitutional right to privacy. In that case, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) wiretapped a public phone booth and listened to the
defendant’s calls. The government then sought to use those calls
against the defendant at trial, which the trial court allowed. 37
In ruling the wiretap unconstitutional by Fourth Amendment
standards, the Supreme Court relied partly on the constitutional
understanding of privacy under that amendment. 38 The Court
articulated that the Constitution does not provide for any general right
to privacy, but rather, protects individual privacy against specific
government intrusion.39 In so holding, the Court articulated that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” even when those
people carry out protected activities in a public space.40
The benchmark test for determining what is constitutionally
protected as privacy was articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion.41 In that opinion, privacy-related interests must meet two
33. Id. at 332.
34. Id. at 334.
35. Id. at 332 (making no argument for or against possessory interest in the seized
drugs or drug paraphernalia).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
38. Id. at 350.
39. Id.; see James K. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 645
(1985) (explaining that even the Supreme Court in the 1960s attempted to understand the
Fourth Amendment in light of a vastly changing modern world instead of construing that
amendment’s provisions from the perspective of an old wooden bench in the eighteenth
century).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“But what [the defendant] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
Interestingly, the balancing approach seeks to protect individuals by looking to the nature
and quality of the intrusion. This necessarily requires courts look at possessory interests
in light of government action, not possessory interests as they exist in and of themselves.
41. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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requirements: (1) the person seeking protection must show a subjective
expectation of privacy; and (2) such an expectation must be one in
which “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 42 In so holding,
such privacy interests that society deems reasonable include neither
public conversations nor objects that are within a protected space but
are nevertheless within “plain view” of the public eye.43
B. Expanding the Reasonableness Inquiry: Delay in Obtaining a Search
Warrant
In United States v. Mitchell,44 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit later considered the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard and expanded upon it for the purposes of
analyzing undue delay in relation to the search and seizure of electronic
devices.45 In 2005, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
took up an investigation of internet child pornography. After admitting
he might have child pornography on his computer, Mitchell gave ICE
agents permission to search his laptop, but denied consent to search his
desktop. Agents ultimately removed the desktop’s hard drive to search
it. Three days later one ICE Agent left for a two-week training course in
Virginia. It was not until twenty-one days after the initial seizure that
the ICE Agent submitted a twenty-three-page affidavit in support of a
warrant. Of those twenty-three pages, twenty pages contained
boilerplate language. After completing the search, ICE Agents
discovered images of child pornography on the hard drive. The trial
court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
his hard drive.46
On appeal, Mitchell challenged the initial seizure of the desktop hard
drive on the ground that the twenty-one-day delay in obtaining a
warrant was unreasonable.47 The Eleventh Circuit held that a warrant
that is based on probable cause could nevertheless violate the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement if law enforcement officers

42. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Courts have since abandoned analysis under the first
prong and relied, almost exclusively, on analysis under the second prong. Tomkovicz,
supra note 39 at 654.
43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). What then, are courts to do in
cases which involve private social media pages? Such pages exist in a quasi-public sphere,
but are nevertheless in a “protected space” by way of passwords and required acceptances
of friend requests.
44. 565 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2009).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1348–50.
47. Id. at 1350.
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delay in obtaining a search warrant for seized property. 48 Further, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that when balancing privacy interests against
government interests, the court should consider that individuals have a
significant possessory and privacy interest in personal computers and
electronic data.49
The Eleventh Circuit overruled the trial court’s denial of Mitchell’s
motion to suppress and further remarked that Mitchell’s possessory
interest was not eliminated, even if diminished, by the presence of
probable cause.50 According to the Eleventh Circuit, there was no
compelling justification for delay because ICE Agents had ample time,
prior to leaving the state, to submit an affidavit for a warrant. Further,
the affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge was lacking in the detail
expected from a twenty-one-day delay.51 Rather, the court’s rationale
urged that expediency was required in this case because the sooner a
warrant is issued, the sooner a property owner’s possessory interest in
his property can be restored to him. 52 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
this applies with even greater force to personal data which “is the
digital equivalent of its owner’s home, capable of holding a universe of
private information.”53 As such, the reasonableness inquiry, as it relates
to delay, is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and is highly dependent
upon the circumstances surrounding the delay.54
In United States v. Burgard,55 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit also analyzed the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness factor in light of undue delay and the seizure of a cell
phone.56 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in United States v.
Mitchell, the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that a six-day delay in

48. Id. Presumably, delay implies lack of sufficient governmental interest sufficient
to defeat individual interest.
49. Id. at 1351 (“Computers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use.
Individuals may store personal letters, emails, financial information, passwords, family
photos, and countless other items of personal nature in electronic form.”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1352.
53. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 735 (2005)).
54. Id. Particularly in light of circumstances which involve the seizure of highly
personal data.
55. 675 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2012).
56. Id. Courts and parties alike commonly juxtapose United States v. Mitchell and
this case, depending on whether the outcome of the case is the exclusion or non-exclusion
of evidence. See State v. Stacey, 171 N.H. 461, 465–67 (2018).
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this case was not unreasonable and, therefore, upheld the trial court’s
decision to deny Burgard’s motion to exclude evidence. 57
In this case, a law enforcement officer obtained information that
Burgard’s cell phone contained sexually explicit images of young girls.
The officer pulled Burgard over while driving, seized his cell phone, and
took it to his precinct to log it into evidence. Burgard followed the officer
to the precinct to obtain the property receipt for his cell phone. Due to
conflicting schedules and a supervening robbery investigation, the
officer was unable to submit an affidavit in support of a warrant until
six days after obtaining Burgard’s phone. Pursuant to that warrant,
officers retrieved sexually explicit images of young girls from Burgard’s
phone.58 The trial court denied Mr. Burgard’s motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the search of his phone.59
The Seventh Circuit applied only a property theory—as opposed to a
privacy theory—of seizure as it relates to the individual’s possessory
interest when it utilized the United States v. Place balancing test.60 The
effect of such a proposition shaped the court’s ruling by articulating a
set of informal factors which heavily implicate property concerns. 61 One
such factor—the brevity of the seizure—implicated a concern for the
infringement upon possession of the item. 62 Additionally, not only is the
brevity of the seizure an important property consideration, but so too is
the defendant’s assertion of some possessory claim to the property
seized.63
In analyzing the government’s interest in retaining possession of the
property, the court heavily relied upon the diligence of officer in
obtaining a search warrant.64 The diligence of law enforcement

57. Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1035.
58. Id. at 1031.
59. Id. at 1030.
60. Id. at 1033 (“On the individual person’s side of this balance the critical question
relates to any possessory interest in the seized object, not to privacy or liberty interests.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. As opposed to some analysis of infringement on the individual’s privacy.
63. Id. This is important because individuals can increase or diminish their
possessory interest based, in part, upon any claim they may assert over their seized
devices, which arose in this Seventh Circuit case, as well as in State v. Rosenbaum.
Rosenbaum, 302 Ga. at 445, 826 S.E.2d at 26. Such an assertion (or reassertion) of
possessory interest could have the effect of tipping the balance in favor of the individual
over the government’s interest.
64. Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034.
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necessarily leads to a presumption that the seized property is of
particular value to the investigation.65
Yet, again in 2012, the Eleventh Circuit revisited its ruling in United
States v. Mitchell and returned to the reasonableness test as related to
the seizure of a hard drive.66 In that case, FBI agents initiated a larger
investigation into a child pornography distribution ring. That
investigation led agents to David Laist. After admitting to possessing
child pornography and signing two separate consent to search forms,
FBI agents inspected Laist’s computer for the incriminating images.
After a prompt investigation of the computer,67 agents decided it was
necessary to seize the laptop. One week after seizing Laist’s computer,
agents received a revocation of consent letter. At that very moment, the
agents began to prepare an affidavit in support of a search warrant. 68
The affidavit contained, in significant detail, support of the agent’s
probable cause to search. Agents obtained a search warrant for the
computer twenty-five days after initially seizing the property.69 Laist,
relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. Mitchell,
moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant.70
The Eleventh Circuit, in this case, articulated a formal set of four
factors for analyzing the reasonableness of delay: (1) the significance of
interference of individual’s possessory interest; (2) the duration of
delay; (3) whether the individual consented to seizure; and (4)
government’s interest in retaining the seized property. 71 While the
court did not formally include investigative diligence as an enumerated
factor, it did articulate the factor as important to the overall analysis. 72
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit departed from the property analysis
undertaken by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Burgard and,
instead, couched its reasonableness analysis under a privacy theory. 73

65. Id. (stating that the policy undergirding its position was not to encourage
slapdash investigative efforts in pursuit of a warrant).
66. United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608 (11th Cir. 2012).
67. Including an instance where Laist showed the agents a picture of child
pornography on the computer.
68. Laist, 702 F.3d at 610–11.
69. Id. at 610, 611.
70. Id. at 612.
71. Id. at 613–14 (citing Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351, Place 462 U.S. at 709, United
States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 235 (3d Cir. 2011), and Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033).
72. Id. at 614 (implicating several other factors important under the diligence inquiry
such as, but not limited to: case complexity, overriding circumstances, quality of warrant
application, and the amount of time expected to produce that warrant).
73. Id. (quoting McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331) (“These factors . . . are the most relevant
when we seek to ‘balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns.”).

[6] HEY SIRI - CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

3/11/2020 10:36 AM

HEY SIRI

669

When applying privacy theory as they did, and in affirming the trial
court’s denial of suppression, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately reasoned
that much of the behavior exhibited by Laist diminished the overall
interest he may have had in his property. 74 This behavior included:
Laist showing agents a photo of child pornography on his computer;
Laist allowing agents to search his computer in his apartment; and
Laist allowing agents to take his computer. 75 This behavior ultimately
implicated Laist’s privacy concerns in his computer, not any property
concern he may have had.76
In contrast, the government’s interest was not only furthered by
Laist’s actions, but also by the diligence of officers in immediately
preparing an affidavit after the revocation of consent. 77 To that end, the
court reasoned that the effort put into the affidavit78 and the complexity
of the child pornography investigation 79 further enhanced the
government’s interest in retaining the property. 80 The court further
pronounced, and renounced any argument to the contrary, proposition
that their ruling in United States v. Mitchell stood for the creation of a
per se rule of unreasonableness. 81 Rather, the most important aspect of
the reasonableness of delay evaluation under the Fourth Amendment is
that it is a fact-sensitive inquiry requiring a case-by-case analysis of the
factors above.82
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In State v. Rosenbaum, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed, as a
matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the
reasonableness standard as it applies to delay in obtaining a warrant
for seized items—specifically electronic devices.83 In adopting the
factors test developed in United States v. Mitchell and refined under

74. Id. at 616–18 (factually distinguishing its holding in Mitchell).
75. Id. at 616.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 616–17.
78. Which contained detailed information beyond mere boilerplate. Id.
79. As a whole and not as specifically related to David Laist. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 618. This is because the Supreme Court has articulated the reasonableness
test as a balancing test. Place, 462 U.S. at 703. See Tomkovicz, supra note 39 and
accompanying text as explanation for why the judicial system has adopted a balancing
test as opposed to a bright-line rule.
82. Laist, 702 F.3d at 618. (quoting Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351).
83. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 449–50, 826 S.E.2d at 25.
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United States v. Laist, an unanimous Georgia Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the Rosenbaums.84
As a starting point, the supreme court premised their analysis on the
foundational principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
articulating that what is at stake in a search and seizure is an
individual’s possessory interest in his property. 85 The court elaborated
that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s framework, this possessory interest
is balanced in light of the four factors specifically enumerated in United
States v. Laist, namely: (a) significance of the interference with the
individual’s possessory interest; (b) duration of the delay; (c) whether
the individual consented to the seizure of his property; and (d) the
government’s legitimate interest in maintaining the property as
evidence.86 Ultimately, the court concluded that delay is a highly
fact-sensitive inquiry that is to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis,
giving weight to all of the relevant circumstances of that case. 87
The court only addressed the first two factors of the inquiry, as there
was clear evidence that the Rosenbaums did not consent to the seizure
of the electronic effects and that the government had a strong interest
in retaining those effects as evidence.88
Moving to each factor in turn, the supreme court looked first at the
significance of the Rosenbaums’ possessory interest in their electronic
devices.89 The most important aspect of the analysis was the nature of
the property seized from the Rosenbaums: electronic devices. 90 As both
the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have enumerated extensively,
individuals have a particularly strong possessory interest in computers
and personal electronic devices.91 Yet further, not only did the
84. Id. at 450, 454–55, 826 S.E.2d at 25–26, 28 (per curiam); Mitchell, 565 F.3d at
1351; Laist, 702 F.3d at 613–14.
85. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 450, 826 S.E.2d at 25 (failing to explicitly analyze the
search and seizure under a property or privacy theory).
86. Id. at 450, 826 S.E.2d at 25–26.
87. Id. at 450–51, 826 S.E.2d at 26.
88. Id. at 452–54, 826 S.E.2d at 26–28.
89. Id. at 451–52, 826 S.E.2d at 26–27.
90. Id. at 451, 826 S.E.2d at 26. Interestingly, some commentators have noted that
the Supreme Court’s analysis of privacy—not explicitly utilized in this case—tends to rest
upon moralistic attitudes in relation to the particular object or activity being adjudicated.
For example, intimate relationships deemed meaningful have a higher constitutional
threshold of privacy than do searches and seizures of something like cocaine. Yet, what
about searches and seizures of less objectionable drugs like marijuana? Or less
objectionable internet content like excessively violent video games? See Lvovsky, supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
91. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 451, 826 S.E.2d at 26. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373 (2014); Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351; Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033; Laist, 702 F.3d at 614.
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government seize the Rosenbaums’ electronic devices but retained those
devices in the face of numerous requests for the return of those items. 92
Thus, important to this inquiry is not only the nature of the property
taken, but also any subsequent reassertion of possessory interest in
that property, as was clearly evidenced in this case. 93 Finally, the
government not only seized personal electronic devices and retained
those electronic devices in the face of numerous requests for return, but
the government neither objected nor offered opposing evidence to rebut
or explain that retention in the face of numerous requests for return. 94
Consequently, the overwhelming evidence in this case led to the
ultimate conclusion that the Rosenbaums neither fatally diminished
their possessory interest in their property, but also that law
enforcement did not diligently seek to obtain a warrant in compliance
with the Fourth Amendment.95
Under the second factor, the supreme court ruled that the duration of
the delay weighed in favor of the Rosenbaums. 96 Pertinent to this
inquiry is not only the length of time between seizure and issuance of
the warrant, but also any relevant circumstances contributing to
delay.97 Such circumstances include: the complexity of the case,
overriding circumstances (such as conflicting schedules or another
case), and the difficulty in preparing an affidavit in support of the
warrant.98 The court concluded that no other case presented before it
had seen the actual length of delay that was posed before the court in
this case: 539 and 702 days respectively.99 Furthermore, the
government demonstrated no presence of particular case complexity, no
drafting difficulty, and no overriding circumstances.100 Rather, the
delay was solely the result of “[M]ultiple errors, failures, and oversights
on the part of the State.”101
And while law enforcement officers did at least properly log the
evidence into its property room and fill out and attach those property
92. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 452, 826 S.E.2d at 26–27.
93. Id. See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033 (“[I]t can be revealing to see whether the
person from whom the item was taken ever asserted a possessory claim to it.”).
94. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 452, 826 S.E.2d at 26–27.
95. Id., 826 S.E.2d at 27.
96. Id. at 454, 826 S.E.2d at 28 (“[T]hat ‘the State did not diligently pursue its
investigation as it relates to the content of these devices’ is amply supported by the
record.”).
97. Id. at 453–54, 826 S.E.2d at 27–28.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 452–53, 826 S.E.2d at 27.
100. Id. at 454, 826 S.E.2d at 28.
101. Id.
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sheets in accordance with department policy, it “inexplicably” could not
locate that evidence after subsequent and numerous requests for
return.102 This was so even despite the revelation that the Rosenbaums’
property had not moved from the original property room since the very
beginning of the investigation.103 Therefore, the court concluded that
law enforcement’s utter lack of diligence in this case was
overwhelmingly supported by the record.104
V. IMPLICATIONS
On its face, this case is deceptively straightforward. Underneath its
surface, however, lurks a much more complex and convoluted issue
regarding how Georgia courts will treat searches and seizures involving
electronic data and devices.105 It is no small matter that the judicial
system has, and continues to, review decisions of personal privacy and
property in the face of our ever-evolving dependency on electronics.106
The supreme court’s analysis in State v. Rosenbaum demonstrates the
court’s willingness to acknowledge and adapt the legal landscape to the
growing complexity surrounding the use of personal electronic devices
such as cellphones and computers. This ruling further stands to
demonstrate the progression that criminal procedure has undertaken as
it continues to adapt to modern technology.
This raises other important considerations as the momentum of
technological advances propels the legal field forward. These
considerations include how the court will handle issues concerning:
data storage on a cloud-like databases, developments in artificial
intelligence, and data collection policies from social media. 107 There has
even been recent concern over DNA collection techniques from popular

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Some have suggested that legislatures are better equipped to handle drastic and
continually evolving issues regarding searches and seizures in relation to technology.
More specifically, legislatures contain more institutional advantages whereas rules
created within the judicial system lack the kind of flexibility needed in an area that is
constantly changing. Kerr, supra note 1 at 858–59.
106. See Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1350; Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 442, 826 S.E.2d at 20;
Henson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 152, 157, 723 S.E.2d 456, 460 (2012) (ruling that an officer
did not exceed the scope of the warrant when he opened a computer file that read “my
pictures” and found photographs of child pornography).
107. Take, for example, the legal implications surrounding use of social media in
election law and Cambridge Analytica’s extremely controversial use of personal data to
influence elections. THE GREAT HACK (Netflix 2019).
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genealogy databases similar to Ancestry and 23andMe. 108 Given
growing concerns regarding technological advancement and the greater
need for privacy protection, the judicial system will need to push
further down the road of progress and anticipate impending concerns in
light of an ever-expanding, and possibly over-sharing, world.
To that end, electronic data “[I]s the digital equivalent of its owner’s
home, capable of holding a universe of private information.” 109 During
the 1980s searches and seizures were questioned under a set of cases
that had nothing to do with personal data. 110 Rather, those cases
fostered greater concern for an individual’s right to their property, as it
relates to seizures, and privacy as it relates to searches. 111 The court
has not been any more articulate about whether the search and seizure
of personal data implicates privacy or property interests. 112 Regardless,
the question for the future is not whether the judicial system will
adjudicate matters of personal data under a privacy or property theory.
Rather, the inquiry is, should the judicial system adjudicate matters of
electronic data under a privacy or property theory?
Adjudication under a property theory necessarily implies that
electronic data will become the virtual equivalent of an owner’s home. 113
Thus, seizing and searching property that the legal system is prepared
to view as an owner’s home will carry with it a higher expectation of
investigative diligence.
On the flip side, adjudication under a privacy theory implicates a
much broader inquiry. Individuals do not have a broad constitutional
right to privacy but do have a greater right to privacy in their own

108. In one case, use of a public genealogy database in California led to the infamous
“Golden State Killer,” Michael DeAngelo. Tina Hesman Seay, Crime solvers embraced
genetic
genealogy,
SCIENCE
NEWS
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/genetic-genealogy-forensics-top-science-stories-2018yir. For interesting background on that case, including how the public genealogy database
came to be used, see Wondery: Man in the Window, L.A. TIMES (June–Sept. 2019),
https://wondery.com/shows/man-in-the-window/. For other controversial uses of genealogy
databases, including investigative techniques that reverse–engineer genetic samples to
trace family trees (which includes looking at the DNA of family members of suspects), see
Jason Tashea, Genealogy sites give law enforcement a new DNA sleuthing tool, but the
battle
over
privacy
looms,
ABA
JOURNAL
(Nov.1,
2019),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/family-tree-genealogy-sites-arm-lawenforcement-with-a-new-branch-of-dna-sleuthing-but-the-battle-over-privacy-looms.
109. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Rupnick, 280 Kan. at 735).
110. Place, 462 U.S. 696; Jacobsen, 466. U.S. 109.
111. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113–14.
112. See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033; contra Laist, 702 F.3d at 614.
113. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1352.
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homes or other protected spaces. 114 If electronic data is the virtual
equivalent of a home, then owners of electronic devices have a
presumptively high privacy right to what is contained therein. Even
from his place on the Supreme Court bench in the 1960s, Justice
Harlan wrote that “a man’s home is . . . where he expects privacy,
but . . . activities[] or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited.”115 Such a statement eerily resounds when
considering the constitutional implications of personal social media
use.116 In contrast, Justice Stewart, in his majority opinion, opined that
those interests individuals “seek to preserve as private,” even in public
spaces, will nevertheless be constitutionally protected as private. 117
Courts of the future must decide whether, under a privacy theory,
they will harken their analysis to the majority or concurrence in Katz or
forge their own path for balancing constitutional privacy and propertyrelated interests in light of the use of personal electronic devices. It
seems clear from Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence that the individual
right to privacy in electronic devices is a legitimate expectation. 118
However, whether society—or better yet, the judicial system—is
prepared to recognize such a right as reasonable is another matter.
What does seem clear is that an important consideration as to what is
reasonable—in this murky area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
is dependent upon the diligence of officers in obtaining a warrant for
sensitive electronic data.119
The diligence requirement has been a consistent theme throughout
Fourth Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence. With the emergence
of technological advancement, the standard for investigative diligence is
now higher than ever. And whether electronic data implicates privacy
or property concerns, that standard will remain high in light of any

114. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring); Symposium, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology:
Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L. J. 51
(2002). Some authors have even suggested that this opinion further redefined the scope of
Fourth Amendment liberties but that such redefinition holds little weight in the modern,
technological era. Id. at 56.
116. This is particularly true when data privacy is viewed, at its heart, as
informational privacy. Tomkovicz, supra note 39, at 666–67 (regarding protection of data
as informational, it is “an interest in maintaining confidentiality or secrecy in not having
data about one’s life learned by the government.”).
117. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
118. See Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351; Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033; Laist, 702 F.3d at 614.
119. See Laist, 702 F.3d at 614, 616–17.
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individual’s strong interest in retaining any possessory claim to the
virtual equivalent of their home.

Sandy Davis
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